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Unconditionally secure communication, being
pursued for thousands of years, however, hasn’t
been reached yet due to continuous competitions
between encryption and hacking. Quantum key
distribution (QKD), harnessing the quantum me-
chanical nature of superposition and non-cloning,
may promise unconditional security by incor-
porating the one-time pad algorithm rigorously
proved by Claude Shannon. Massive efforts have
been made in building practical and commercial
QKD systems, in particular, decoy states are
employed to detect photon-number splitting
attack against single-photon source loophole, and
measurement-device-independent (MDI) QKD
has further closed all loopholes in detection side,
which leads to a seemingly real-life application.
Here, we propose and experimentally demon-
strate an MDI-QKD hacking strategy on the
trusted source assumption by using injection
locking technique. Eve injects near off-resonance
photons in randomly chosen polarization into
sender’s laser, where injection locking in a shifted
frequency can happen only when Eve’s choice
matches with sender’s state. By setting a shifted
window and switching the frequency of photons
back afterwards, Eve in principle can obtain all
the keys without terminating the real-time QKD.
We observe the dynamics of a semiconductor
laser with injected photons, and obtain a hacking
success rate reaching 60.0%. Our results suggest
that the spear-and-shield competitions on uncon-
ditional security may continue until all potential
loopholes are discovered and closed ultimately.
QKD is the best-known application of quantum cryptog-
raphy, capable of distributing secure keys between two
communication parties (known as Alice and Bob) in the
presence of eavesdroppers (Eve). Both theoretical and
experimental accomplishments have been made over the
past decades [1–4], and commercial QKD systems are
now available on the market providing enhanced secu-
rity for communication. Nevertheless, real-life devices are
hard to conform with the hypotheses of theoretical secu-
rity proofs, leading to continuous hacking strategies tar-
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geting at imperfections of certain devices in actual QKD
implementations.
Enormous efforts have been made in developing hack-
ing and its countermeasures aiming to improve security
of QKD. Apart from few source-side attacks like phase
information attack [5] that emphasizes the significance
of phase randomization condition, most of attackers tar-
get at the physical loopholes at detection side, which is
the most vulnerable part in QKD setups, such as time
shift [6–8], time information [9], detector control [10–12],
detector dead time [13] and channel calibration [14] at-
tacks. A straightforward way to resist those attackers
is to add corresponding countermeasures into QKD sys-
tems for each certain loophole [15, 16]. For instance,
decoy-state protocol [17–19], marked as a milestone to-
wards practical QKD, utilizes different intensities to de-
tect photon-number splitting attack, allowing the same
security level as perfect single-photon source scenarios.
DI-QKD [20–22] is proposed to waive all the assump-
tions of trusted parties, either detection or source side,
whereas it requires a detection efficiency higher than
80%. While DI-QKD can close all the physical loop-
holes, its stringent requirement on detection efficiency is
extremely challenging and remains to be met, limiting its
application in ambient conditions due to the short achiev-
able channel and the requirement of near-unit-efficiency
detection. MDI-QKD is developed to close all poten-
tial detection-side loopholes, and most importantly its
implementation is within current technology, meanwhile
its key rate and achievable channel remain acceptable
[23]. MDI-QKD, together with decoy-state protocol, has
closed all most all the known attacks on the remaining
physical loopholes, and therefore provides a practically
feasible and seemingly sufficient security.
Here, we show that it is still possible to attack a mature
MDI-QKD system by conceiving a novel scheme and ex-
ploiting a new device loophole in source side. We demon-
strate that Eve can control Alice’s source by forcing her
laser resonant at a designed frequency. We analyze and
experimentally observe the injection-locking dynamics of
a semiconductor laser, and obtain a hacking success rate
of 60.0% and error rate of 6.1%, with appropriate injec-
tion power 110 nW. To test the robustness of hacking
scheme in practice, a series of countermeasures made by
Alice are conducted by adding 1dB and 3dB isolation,
which leads to the slight declines of success rate to 44.0%
and 36.1% respectively, still considerably high informa-
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2FIG. 1. Sketch of injection locking strategy hacking an MDI-QKD system. At Alice’s station, the WCP source
is realized by a high photon-flux laser and isolators. The wavelength of Alice’s laser is 852.355nm, while that of Eve’s laser
is detuned by 251MHz. Eve inserts a beamsplitter into the communication channel, and injects pulses with four randomly
coded polarization states into Alice’s site. A Fabry-Perot cavity serves as a spectrum filter to block unwanted photons, and
an acoustic optical modulator (AOM) is utilized to shift frequency back to Alice’s, and also works as a temporal filter. The
complete set of polarization-matching situations of Alice and Eve is shown as the insert. For the matched cases, Alice’s laser
is frequency shifted well and become very distinct from the unmatched cases, and therefore can be selected by the cavity filter
to form an effective information leakage. The dashed lines is for eye guiding to indicate the frequency of encoded photons from
Alice at different stages.
tion leakage. Furthermore, Alice’s isolation can be elim-
inated by increasing the injection laser power. Given the
assumption that Eve has unlimited capabilities as long as
being subject to quantum mechanics, for example infinite
laser power, she can always hack MDI-QKD systems with
constantly high success rate.
As is shown in Figure 1, Alice and Bob prepare weak
coherent pulses (WCPs) in four BB84 polarization states,
and send them to an untrusted relay to perform a Bell
state measurement as a typically MDI-QKD does [23]. To
demonstrate the hacking strategy, Eve (known as mas-
ter laser) injects a beam of near off-resonance pulse with
TABLE I. Standard post-selection process in QKD and
Eve’s strategy. After the measurement-side announces suc-
cessful results, Alice and Bob pose-select the incidents that
they use the same bases. Eve discards the events that her
bases are different from Alice’s, and keeps the rest. R: recti-
linear basis; D: diagonal basis.
Alice Bob Eve Post-Selection Strategy
R R R
Keep Keep
D D D
R R D
Keep Discard
D D R
R D R/D
— —
D R R/D
four randomly chosen polarization states into Alice’s laser
(known as slave laser) backward. From the inset of Figure
1, we can see that injection locking in a shifted frequency
can happen only when Eve’s choice matches with Alice’s
state. By setting a shifted window via a frequency filter,
Eve maximizes the transmittance for the photons in the
matched cases, with which Eve in principle can obtain
all the keys. It should be noticed that the frequency of
transmitted photons can be converted back, before be-
ing sent to measurement and interfered with Bob’s pho-
tons, thus the whole hacking process doesn’t terminate
the real-time QKD.
The detuned pulses from Eve’s master laser are pre-
pared in four polarization states randomly. Alice’s slave
laser, a semiconductor laser in a wavelength of 852.355nm
near cesium D2 line, can be in the stage of either
stable locking or nonlinear process, when it is exter-
nally injected with monochromatic photons under var-
ious injection-power levels [25]. In the nonlinear regime,
many frequency components are generated, and multi-
mode competition appears. With the increase of injected
photons, the frequency of the slave laser approaches that
of master’s completely when the injection power exceeds
the stable locking threshold. A Fabry-Perot cavity that
only resonant with the frequency of the master laser can
serve as a spectrum filter to block unlocked photons and
pick out the matched events. The following acoustic op-
tical modulator can serve as frequency shifter as well as
a temporal filter, which further contribute to block un-
3FIG. 2. Theoretical and experimental results of the
dynamical behavior of an injected semiconductor
laser. Dark gray curve is the theoretical value of counts,
and red squares are the measured counts with the increase of
injection power. Area in green represents nonlinear process,
where multi-wave mixing appears. Area in purple represents
stable locking process. Error bar comes form transmittance
jitter of the cavity filter in a slightly disturbed environment.
wanted photons.
A hacking event is considered as successful if Eve
chooses the same bases with Alice: let the same polarized
photons pass through the cavity filter, while block or-
thogonally polarized photons. Afterwards, Eve monitors
Alice and Bob’s post-selection results, as in BB84 proto-
col, and keeps the data where they use the same bases
and discards the rest according to Table I. Moreover, once
a quantum communication process is completed, Eve ap-
plies the same operation with Alice according to the an-
nounced measurement results (typically see Table I in
reference [23]), to guarantee that she possesses the right
bit streams as well as Alice’s and Bob’s.
In order to increase hacking success rate and decrease
error rate, the injection power must be strong enough
to lock slave laser, and simultaneously half of this power
should be too weak to do so. As is shown in Figure
2, we simulate the dynamics of a single-mode semicon-
ductor laser with injected photons theoretically, and ob-
tain the intensity of output photons by numerical sim-
ulation and spectrum analysis, see Supplementary In-
formation for more details. We further experimentally
demonstrate this dynamics process by setting a series of
injection power and recording counts of output photons
after the cavity filter, as the square points presented in
Figure 2, which follow our theoretical simulation very
well. With such a test, we can clearly see the nonlin-
ear regime and locking regime, and more importantly it
identifies a transition point. The pulses that match with
FIG. 3. Experimental results of a typical hacking per-
formance. a. Photon number distribution of all 16 com-
binations of Eve’s and Alice’s polarization states. Columns
in red (
√
) are the successful-hacked keys. Columns in dark
blue (×) are the observed errors in the keys. Columns in light
blue (NULL) are invalid events that will be discarded after
a standard post-selection in QKD. b. Shape of pulses that
transmitted through the cavity filter when the polarization
angles between Eve and Alice are in 0◦ (left), 45◦ (middle)
and 90◦ (right). Arrows refer to FWHM fitted with Gaussian
function.
Alice’s polarization should have enough power to enable
injection locking, and all other pulses are in the nonlin-
ear regime. Apparently, the sharper the transition is, the
higher success rate and lower error rate we can achieve
in the hacking process.
Based on the characterized dynamical behavior of Al-
ice’s laser shown in Figure 2, we set the injection power
at 110 nW, slightly stronger than the transition point to
demonstrate a typical hacking performance. The mea-
sured photon flux transmitted through the cavity filter
at all possible combinations of Eve’s and Alice’s polar-
ization states are shown as a three dimensional histogram
and its top view (see Figure 3a and the inset). Light blue
columns represent transmitted photons in the case of that
Alice and Eve choose the different bases, and therefore
will be discarded after a standard post-selection in QKD.
Red and dark blue columns represent transmitted pho-
tons when Alice and Eve choose the same bases, which
will be kept. In particular, the red parts are correct-
hacked keys, and dark blue parts represents error.
Defining the eavesdropping success rate as the ratio
of the amount of kept data and total incidents, and the
eavesdropping error rate as the proportion of mistakes in
kept data. The successful rate measured at 110 nW in-
jection power reaches 60.0%, and the error rate is 6.1%.
The error mainly comes from the failure of blocking un-
4FIG. 4. Hacking performance under the isolation countermeasure strategy with additional channel attenuation.
Eve’s injection power is fixed at 110 nW, then counts of transmitted photons are measured under the condition of adding (a)
0 dB, (b) 1 dB and (c) 3 dB attenuation meanwhile Alice raises the laser power as a compensation. Figures above present the
photon number distribution of all 16 combinations of Eve’s and Alice’s polarization states. The inserts below emphasize on
error rate in successful-hacked events, as circled in red, and the values in boxes detail the counts of photons under corresponding
situations. Apparently, still considerable successful-hacked keys can be obtained in all the cases.
TABLE II. Experimental results of success rate and error rate of hacking strategy under different situations.
Light Source WCP High photon flux
Injection power (nW) 110 119 110
Isolation (dB) 0 1 3 0 0
Success rate (%) 60.0 44.0 36.1 47.0 67.4
Error rate (%) 6.1 10.0 15.4 9.8 1.7
wanted photons, due to the fact that the injection lock-
ing can not be ceased completely in the nonlinear regime.
Few errors come from the fluorescent nooise of the slave
laser, the scattering on the beam splitter, and also the
limited extinction rate of the cavity filter. Pulse shapes
of transmitted photons in three injection levels are illus-
trated as Figure 3b. We can clearly see that the intensity
obtained in locking regime is much stronger than that in
nonlinear regime.
A very straightforward countermeasure strategy that
we can think of against the hacking strategy is to add
more isolation to block Eve’s injection. We realize this
by adding 1dB and 3dB loss while increasing the laser
power in Alice’s station as a compensation. As is shown
in Figure 4 and also in Table II, we do observe a de-
cline of the hacking success rate slightly from 60.0% to
44.0% and 36.1%, and an increase of the hacking error
rate from 6.1% to 10.0% and 15.4%, respectively. Keep-
ing other conditions unchanged, we can see that while the
isolation countermeasure strategy can lower the hacking
success rate and raise the error rate, unfortunately, still
considerable part of keys are hacked successfully. Fur-
thermore, Alice’s isolation can be eliminated by increas-
ing the injection laser power, which leads to a new transi-
tion point. Given the assumption that Eve has unlimited
capabilities as long as being subject to quantum mechan-
ics, for example infinite laser power, she can always hack
MDI-QKD systems with constantly high success rate.
More experimental results under different conditions
are summarized in Table II. Hacking performance of
WCP sources under four different injection power situa-
tions indicates the optimal hacking power and the robust-
ness of the hacking strategy. The additional experiment
for hacking high photon flux source raises the amount of
signal while keeps noise constant, which means signal-to-
noise ratio is increased. The outcome reveals the negative
influence of noise in our implementations, which can be
improved by further reducing the scattering on the beam
splitter and narrowing the window of the temporal filter.
In summary, we propose and demonstrate an MDI-
QKD hacking strategy on the trusted source assump-
tion by using injection locking technique, with a suc-
cess rate approaching 60.0% and an error rate as low
as 6.1%. We also propose and demonstrate an isola-
5tion countermeasure strategy to test the robustness of
the injection locking strategy. While the performance of
the hacking strategy degrades, unfortunately, still signif-
icant amounts of keys are eavesdropped without being
detected. Even worse, unconditional security of QKD is
under the assumption that Eve has the power only sub-
jected to quantum mechanics, apparently with infinite
laser power, Eve will always be able to hack MDI-QKD
systems even with the isolation protection.
A sufficient security is possible if Alice added many
order more isolation, since Eve cannot possess infinite
laser power in practice. Of course, the whole system of
MDI-QKD will have to become more complicated and
expensive. However, the main message we would like to
deliver here is that there may exist many other physical
loopholes remaining undiscovered when we believe that
MDI-QKD has already been a very mature and com-
mercially available solution. Our results suggest that
the spear-and-shield competitions on unconditionally se-
cure communication may continue, and hacking strate-
gies, though their anti-hacking solutions may be readily
available, should be enthusiastically pursued to discover
and close all potential loopholes for genuinely uncondi-
tional security.
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Supplementary Note 1: Dynamics of a semiconductor laser with injected photons
Here we present theoretical details of the dynamics of a single-mode semiconductor laser with external injection.
When the slave laser injected with increasingly stronger external photon flux, it transforms from nonlinear regime to
locking regime under weak injection situations, and after a complex intermediate region, it ends at a strong injection
locking regime [1]. Here we just simulate weak injection situations needed in our experiment.
The external injection process is described by adding a forcing term to the Lang-Kobayashi model [2]:
d
dt
E0(t) =
1
2
(1 + iα)GN∆N(t)E(t) + κExe
iνt (S1)
d
dt
∆N(t) = −
(
1
TS
+GNP0
)
∆N(t)−
[
1
TP
+GN∆N(t)
](
|E(t)|2 − P0
)
(S2)
where E(t) represents the total changeable electric field; Ex is the amplitude of injected photons, and ν is the difference
of frequency between injected and original photons. Note that all electric fields mentioned here are normalized so that
the square of their amplitudes give the corresponding photon numbers in laser cavity. δN(t) represents the difference
of carrier numbers between actual and original situations; κ is the fees-in rate (reciprocal value of round-trip-time in
laser cavity); P0 stands for the number of original photons. Others are the parameters of the semiconductor laser, as
is shown in Table I.
Supplementary Table 1. Parameters of semiconductor laser used in calculation.
α 4.5 m−1 Linewidth Enhancement Factor
GN 5× 103 s−1 Gain Coefficient
κ 1.2136× 1011 ps−1 Fees-in Rate
TS 0.8059 ns Electro-hole Recombination Time
TP 1.1628 ps Photon Lifetime
P0 3.5183× 105 − Original Photon Number
αm 3896 − Facet Loss
νg 7.5× 107 m/s Velocity
~ω 1.456 eV Photon Energy
When injected with external photon flux, the variance of electric filed can be simulated by numerically integrating
equations (1) and (2), and after applying Fourier transform, the amplitude of injection-amplified laser is calculated.
Since what we concerned here is the power of the laser with a certain frequency, the relation between output power
(Ppower) and photon number in laser cavity (P ) is described as [3]:
Ppower =
1
2
αmνg~ωP (S3)
FIG. S1 demonstrates the varying electric field, amplitude and spectrum results with Ex =0.3 (a), 1.2 (b), 1.7 (c).
The initial state in simulation is set to the original state of the slave laser, and thus it takes several nanoseconds to
evolve. So we use the later part for Fourier analysis, which is circled in Figure1.
7Supplementary Figure 1. Simulation results of injection-locking dynamics. The varying electric field (left), amplitude
(middle) and spectrum (right) results with (a) Ex = 0.3, (b) Ex = 1.2, (a) Ex = 1.7. Red circles mark the regions used for
Fourier analysis, and red arrows indicate the target frequency component.
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